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Abstract
This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to
be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual
reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of max-
imizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents.
Analyzing these situations a new class of transferable utility games is introduced, called
multipurpose resource games. These games are based on the bankruptcy model, as intro-
duced by O'Neill (1982). It is shown that every multipurpose resource game is compromise
stable. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.
Keywords: bankruptcy games, compromise stability, nucleolus
JEL classication code: C71
1 Introduction
The model of bankruptcy situations was rst analyzed from a game theoretic perspective by
O'Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy situation a certain amount of money, the estate, has to be
divided among a group of claimants. Each claimant has a justied claim on the estate such that
the sum of these claims exceeds the available estate. The example originally given by O'Neill is
of the division of an estate amongst several heirs when the estate cannot meet all the deceased's
commitments. Another example is of a rm going bankrupt, whose remaining assets do not cover
the total demand of all creditors.
Many rules have been proposed to fairly allocate the estate in bankruptcy situations. Some
of these rules are based on the associated cooperative bankruptcy game where the worth of a
coalition is equal to what is left of the estate if all other claimants would receive their demands.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) proposed and characterized a rule that coincides with the nucle-
olus of this corresponding bankruptcy game. For an overview on bankruptcy rules we refer to
Thomson (2003).
The bankruptcy model is a general framework for various kinds of allocation problems and is
applied to many cases such as cost-sharing problems (Moulin, 1991), taxation problems (Young,
1988), and apportionment of indivisible good(s) problems (Young, 1995). In the past, several
extensions are proposed for the basic bankruptcy model. One of them is Calleja et al. (2005)
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1where multi-issue allocation problems are analyzed. A second is Kaminski (2000), where claims
are multidimensional rather than one-dimensional.
In this paper we present another extension for the traditional bankruptcy problem. In a
multipurpose resource allocation (MPRA) situation there is a limited supplied resource (e.g.
water). Agents are characterized by a justied claim on the resource and a reward function
which describes the (monetary) reward for assigned resources. A specic resource assignment
leads to some total joint reward obtained by the agents. The aim is to nd a fair allocation of
the maximum joint reward. In particular, rewards may be redistributed among the agents such
that agents are compensated who cede their resources to others.
The general framework we propose in this paper is applicable to the eld of water resource
management. Water resource management often involves a multitude of dierent agents with dif-
ferent interests who put their claim on a common-pool resource. The Tennessee Valley Authority
case (Ransmeier, 1942) is one of the earliest cases that oered game theorists an opportunity to
examine a practical problem of cost allocation in a water resources development project. Stran
and Heaney (1981) outlined some basic cooperative game theoretic principles embedded in the
analysis of this case and translated the main cost allocation methods into `game theory lan-
guage'. In Carraro et al. (2005), Parrachino et al. (2006), and Zara et al. (2006) an elaborated
review is provided of game theoretic water con
ict resolution studies. For a recent overview of
the literature about game theory and water resources we refer to Madani (2010).
A game theoretic analysis of MPRA-situations falls within the framework of operations re-
search games. These games are concerned with the combinatorial optimization problem of nding
a joint optimal structure like a network or processing order. After the optimal structure is de-
termined, cooperative game theory is applied subsequently to analyze the allocation of rewards.
A survey of operations research games is provided by Borm et al. (2001).
Also for MPRA-situations we rst analyze a joint optimization problem, the maximization
of total joint reward via an optimal assignment of resources. Secondly, the maximum total
joint reward is allocated to the agents. This is done by analyzing the associated cooperative
multipurpose resource (MR) game. For this game the value of a particular coalition re
ects the
maximum total joint reward that can be derived from the amount of resources not claimed by
agents outside the coalition. It is shown that MR-games extend bankruptcy games and that
the property of compromise stability can be extended to MR-games, although the property
of convexity is not maintained in general. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus
(Schmeidler, 1969) for MR-games is provided.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the formal model of multipurpose resource
allocation situations is described and the optimal assignments of resources are characterized.
In section 3, we introduce and analyze corresponding multipurpose resource games. Section 4
is devoted to compromise stability and the computation of the nucleolus. Technical proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Multipurpose Resource Allocation Situations
This section formally introduces multipurpose resource allocation situations. After introducing
the model, optimal assignments of resources, in which the total joint reward is maximized, are
characterized .
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N;E;d), where N represents a nite set of claimants,
E  0 is the estate (e.g money) which has to be divided among the claimants, and d 2 RN
++ is a
vector of claims, where for i 2 N, di represents agent i's claim on the estate. To justify the term
`bankruptcy' it is assumed that
P
j2N dj  E.
2An MPRA-situation extends a bankruptcy situation (N;E;d), with an estate E of some
resource (e.g. water) and a claim vector d on this resource, by adding a reward vector  2 RN
++
in the following way. For every agent i 2 N there exists a reward function ri : R+ ! R+
describing the monetary gain of resources for agent i. For every z 2 R+;ri(z) denotes the
monetary reward for agent i if he is assigned z units of resource. In this paper the focus is on
linear reward functions. Hence, for every i 2 N there exists an i 2 R++ such that ri(z) = iz.
An MPRA-situation will be summarized by (N;E;d;). The class of all MPRA-situations with
set of agents N is denoted by MPRAN.
An outcome for an MPRA-situation consists of two elements: an assignment of resources
and an allocation of the associated monetary reward. Throughout this paper `assignment' refers
to the distribution of resources (e.g. water) and `allocation' to the distribution of rewards (e.g.





xj = E (1)







yi(x)  0 for all i 2 N (4)
for all (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN. Constraint (1) tells us that the sum of assigned resources is equal
to the estate. Constraint (2) ensures that the assigned resources do not exceed the demand and
are non-negative for all agents in N. Let F(N;E;d;) be the set of feasible assignments x









xj = E;0  xi  di for all i 2 N

:
Constraint (3) ensures that the total reallocated sum of rewards is equal to the total joint reward
obtained from the underlying assignment x. One specic type of solutions are the direct solutions.
A solution f is called direct, if for all (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN, we have that f(N;E;d;) =
(x;r(x)) for some x 2 F(N;E;d;), where r(x) = (ixi)i2N is the direct reward vector with
respect to x.
Example 2.1. Consider an MPRA-situation (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN with N = f1;2;3g and
estate E = 3. Assume that agent 1 claim 2 units of resource, the others both claim 1. Therefore,
the demand vector equals d = (2;1;1). Note that the sum of these demands exceeds the available
estate such that not all agents can obtain their full demand. With reward vector  = (1;1;2)
e.g. the reward function of agent 1 is given by r1(z) = z for z such that 0  z  d1. Consider
the feasible assignment x = (2;1;0) with total joint reward 3. Note that r(x) = (2;1;0) while
e.g. also y(x) = (1;1;1) satises conditions (3) and (4). 
The set of feasible assignments is large and there are many possible (re)allocations of the
corresponding rewards. Throughout this article, assignments of resources are considered which
maximize the total joint reward. The remainder of this section is dedicated to nding these
optimal assignments.






















Before characterizing the set X(N;E;d;) of optimal assignments we introduce some addi-
tional notations. Let m = jfiji 2 Ngj be the number of dierent reward parameters. Recur-



























for all l 2 f2;:::;mg. For l 2 f1;:::;mg let l be the uniquely dened reward parameter for
every agent in Nl. Clearly, 1 > 2 >  > m. Denote the total demand of agents in Nl as
d(Nl), i.e. d(Nl) =
P
j2Nl dj. Dene the pivot index k 2 f1;:::;mg such that
k 1 X
l=1






j2N dj, then we assume k = m. With pivot index k dene three disjoint sets P1;P2










Note that P1 and P3 may be empty, but P2 is always non-empty.
Example 2.2. Reconsider the MPRA-situation of Example 2.1. Clearly, N1 = f3g with
1 = 3 = 2 and N2 = f1;2g with 2 = 1 = 2 = 1. Observe that
d(N1) = 1 < E = 3 < d(N1) + d(N2) = 4
Hence, the pivot index is k = 2. Consequently, P1 = N1 = f3g;P2 = N2 = f1;2g, and P3 = ;. 
Optimal assignments, which maximize the total joint reward, are characterized in the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Let (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN and x 2 F(N;E;d;). Then x 2 X(N;E;d;) if
and only if xi = di for all i 2 P1 and xi = 0 for all i 2 P3.




xj = E  
X
j2P1
xj > E  
X
j2P1




4We may conclude that there is at least one agent j 2 P2 [ P3 for which xj > 0. Since j < i,
the total joint reward would strictly increase if agent j transfers minfdi xi;xjg to agent i. This
establishes a contradiction.







xj > 0 > E  
k X
l=1




Consequently, there is at least one agent j 2 P1 [ P2 whose demand is not fully satised, i.e.
xj < dj. Since j > i, the total joint reward would increase if agent i transfers minfdj  xj;xig
to agent j. This establishes a contradiction and proves the only if part.
The fact that all assignments x 2 F(N;E;d;) such that xi = di for all i 2 P1 and xi = 0
for all i 2 P3 lead to the same total joint reward nishes the proof.




In general there is not a unique optimal assignment. The MPRA-situations for which there
is exactly one optimal assignment are characterized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. Let (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN. Then jX(N;E;d;)j = 1 if and only if E = P
j2P1 dj or jP2j = 1.
3 Multipurpose Resource Games
In this section we introduce the class of multipurpose resource (MR) games. A transferable utility
(TU) game is an ordered pair (N;v) where N is the nite set of agents, and v the characteristic
function on 2N, the set of all subsets of N. The function v assigns to every coalition S 2 2N a
real number v(S) with v(;) = 0. Here, v(S) is called the worth or value of the coalition S. The
set of all TU-games with set of agents N is denoted by TUN. Where no confusion arises, we
write v rather then (N;v).
Consider a bankruptcy situation (N;E;d). For the associated bankruptcy (BR) game vE;d









for all S 2 2N.
Now consider an MPRA-situation M = (N;E;d;). We assume that a coalition S can only
use the amount of resources D(S) not demanded by the agents in NnS. Let (S;D(S);d jS; jS) 2









5Note that D(N) = E. The class of MR-games extends the class of BR-games, i.e. every BR-
game can be written as an MR-game in which i = j for all i;j 2 N. In the MR-game vM,






Let Sl = S\Nl for all l 2 f1;:::;mg. We extend the denition of the pivot index, as provided








If D(S) = 0, then we assume that k(S) = 1 and if D(S) =
P
j2S dj, then we assume k(S) = m.
Let xS 2 X(S;D(S);d jS; jS) be an optimal assignment of resources to agents in S. Theo-
rem 2.1 tells us that xS
i = di for all i 2 S1[[Sk(S) 1 and xS
i = 0 for all i 2 Sk(S)+1[[Sm.
Clearly, vM(S) equals the total direct reward of agents in S associated to xS. This allows us to
construct an explicit formula for vM(S).











for all S 2 2N n f;g.
Example 3.1. Consider the MPRA-situation of Example 2.1 where E = 3;d = (2;1;1) and
 = (1;1;2). The corresponding values of D(S), k(S), and vM(S) are given in the table below.
S 1 2 3 1,2 1,3 2,3 N
D(S) 1 0 0 2 2 1 3
k(S) 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
vM(S) 1 0 0 2 3 2 4
We illustrate the underlying computations for coalition S = f1;2g. Note that N1 = f3g, S1 = ;
and N2 = S2 = f1;2g. The amount of available resources equals
D(S) = maxf0;3   1g = 2:
This yields,
d(S1) < D(S) < d(S1) + d(S2)
0 < 2 < 0 + 3
and consequently, k(S) = 2. Therefore,
vM(12) = 1d(S1) + 2(D(S)   d(S1))
= 2  0 + 1(2   0) = 2:

From Example 3.1 we immediately see that MR-games are not convex in general since the
condition
v(S [ fig)   v(S)  v(T [ fig)   v(T)
6for all S  T  N n fig is violated for S = f3g;T = f1;3g and i = 2.
Lemma 3.2 describes a relation between pivot indices of two coalitions.
Lemma 3.2. Let (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN. Let S;T 2 2N be such that S  T. Then
k(S)  k(T):
Lemma 3.3 provides a monotonicity result for optimal assignments.
Lemma 3.3. Let (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN. Let S;T 2 2N be such that S  T. Let xT 2









for all l 2 f1;:::;mg.
The proofs of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 can be found in the Appendix.













yj  v(S) for all S 2 2N

:
For a game v 2 TUN and T  N, T 6= ; the subgame v jT2 TUT is dened by
v jT (S) = v(S)
for all S 2 2T. Note that v jN= v. A game v 2 TUN is called totally balanced if every subgame
is balanced, i.e. if every subgame has a non-empty core.
Theorem 3.4. Every MR-game is totally balanced.
Proof. Let M = (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN with corresponding MR-game vM. Let T  N and let
the assignment xT 2 X(T;D(T);d jT; jT) be such that vM(T) =
P
j2T jxT
j . Let y(xT) =
(ixT
i )i2T be the direct allocation. To prove that vM is totally balanced, it is sucient to prove
that y(xT) 2 C(vM jT). First note that
P
j2T yj(xT) = vM(T) by denition. Secondly, consider



































The second and third equality follows from Theorem 2.1. From Lemma 3.2 we see that k(S) 
k(T). If k(S) < k(T), then the inequality is readily veried. If k(S) = k(T), then we use Lemma
3.3 to see that this inequality holds. The last equality follows from Theorem 3.1.
74 Compromise Stability and the Nucleolus
In this section we prove that MR-games are compromise stable and we derive an explicit expres-
sion for the nucleolus of MR-games.









yj = v(N);m(v)  y  M(v)

where the utopia demand Mi(v) of agent i 2 N is dened by
Mi(v) = v(N)   v(Nnfig)










Note that mi(v)  v(fig) for all i 2 N. Moreover, for any TU-game v it holds that C(v)  CC(v).
Example 4.1. Let M = (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN, with N = f1;2;3;4g, E = 5, d = (2;1;3;1)
and  = (4;3;2;1). Then the corresponding MR-game vM is given by
S 1 2 3 4 1,2 1,3 1,4 2,3 2,4 3,4 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4 N
v
M(S) 0 0 2 0 4 10 4 5 0 4 13 8 12 7 15
It is readily veried that M(vM) = (8;3;7;2) and m(vM) = (3;0;2;0) while
CC(vM) = Convf(8;3;4;0);(8;3;2;2);(8;0;7;0);(8;0;5;2);(5;3;7;2);(3;3;7;2);(6;0;7;2)g:
Moreover, since each of the seven extreme points of the core cover belong to the core, we may
conclude that C(vM) = CC(vM) 
Quant et al. (2005) dene a game v 2 TUN to be compromise stable if
C(v) = CC(v)
and CC(v) 6= ;. Moreover, it was proved that each BR-game is both convex and compromise
stable while reversely, each convex and compromise stable game is strategically equivalent to a
BR-game.
In what follows N i is a shorthand notation for N n fig.
Lemma 4.1. Let M = (N;E;d;) 2 MPRAN, let vM be the corresponding MR-game, and let
i 2 N.
1. If di  E, then Mi(vM) = vM(N):
2. If di < E , then
a. Mi(vM) = idi... if i 2 P1;
b. Mi(vM) = k(N)di if i 2 P2 [ P3 and k(N i) = k(N);















Mi(vM) = k(N)di if i 2 P2 [ P3 and k(N i) < k(N).
8Proof. 1: Let di  E. Then D(N i) = 0 and vM(N i) = 0. Therefore,
Mi(vM) = vM(N)   vM(N i) = vM(N):
2: Let di < E. Set k = k(N),
2a: Let i 2 P1. We start by showing that k(N i) = k. By denition of k we have
k 1 X
l=1








































ld(Nl)   idi + k






= vM(N)   idi:
and
Mi(vM) = vM(N)   vM(N i) = idi:




























































If k(N i) = k, then this simplies into
Mi(vM) = kdi:




































to establish that v is compromise stable.
Clearly, m(vM)  0 for an MR-game vM. Using this observation the appendix shows that
every MR-game is compromise stable.








for all S 2 2N n f;g. Consequently, vM is compromise stable.
Next we derive an explicit expression for the nucleolus of an MR-game. Recall (cf. Au-
mann and Maschler (1985)) that the nucleolus n(vE;d) of bankruptcy game vE;d 2 TUN can be
computed as follows:






















with  such that
P
j2N minf;dig = E.
Although vM is not necessarily convex and therefore not strategically equivalent to a BR-
game, the nucleolus of vM corresponds to the AM-rule of a related BR-problem.













Mj(vM)  vM(N) = ^ E
because C(vM) 6= ; and the core is a subset of the core cover for any game. Hence ( ^ E; ^ d) is a
BR-problem and, consequently
n(v ^ E;^ d) = AM( ^ E; ^ d):
Next we show that C(vM) = C(v ^ E;^ d). Observe that vM(N) = v ^ E;^ d(N). Since Theorem 4.2
implies that
vM(S)  v ^ E;^ d(S)
for all S 2 2N n f;g it is clear that C(v ^ E;^ d)  C(vM). To prove also the reverse inclusion, let
y 2 C(vM) and S  N. We will prove that
P


















we nd that X
j2S
yj  v ^ E;^ d(S):
Potters and Tijs (1994) prove that for any two games v;w 2 TUN with C(v) = C(w) and v
convex it holds that n(v) = n(w). From this we may conclude that
n(vM) = n(v ^ E;^ d)
and hence






In this Appendix we present the proofs of Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3, and Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let S  T  N. We will prove that
k(S)  k(T):
















This implies D(S) = 0 and k(S) = 1.


























If D(S) = 0, then k(S) = 1  k(T) by denition. Therefore, we may assume that D(S) > 0
and D(S) = D(T)  
P























where the rst and last inequality follow from (6). This implies that k(S)   1 < k(T) and
consequently k(S)  k(T).









If D(S) = 0, then it holds that X
j2Sl
xS





Assume D(S) > 0. As before, this implies that D(S) = D(T) 
P
j2TnS dj. If l > k(S), then
xS
j = 0 for all j 2 Sl and X
j2Sl
xS





If l < k(T), then it holds that xT












12Since S  T, it follows from Lemma 3.2 that k(S)  k(T). Therefore, the only case that remains


































































where the rst and fth equality hold by Theorem 2.1.









For D(S) = 0 it holds that vM(S) = 0 and inequality (8) is easily veried.





Mj(vM)  vM(S) (9)
Set k = k(N). First let fNl n Sljl 2 fk;:::;mgg = ;. This tells us that
D(S) = E  
X
j2NnS




























































Here, the second and last equality follows from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.1(2a).


























































































Here, the rst equality follows from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.1(2a), the inequality because
k < l for all l 2 fk(S);:::;k  1g. The last equality follows from the fact that Mi(vM) = kdi




Thirdly, let fNl n Sljl 2 fk;:::;mgg 6= ; and let agent i 2
m S
l=k
(Nl n Sl) be such that
k(N i) < k. Without loss of generality, assume that di  dj for all j 2
m S
l=k
(Nl n Sl). We will































































































































































































The rst equality follow from Theorem 3.1, Lemma 4.1(2a,2b). The third equality holds by
using Lemma 3.2 such that k(N i)  k(S) for i 2 N n S. The rst and second inequality
are due to the fact that k(N i) < l for all l 2 fk(S);:::;k(N i)   1g, k(N i) > l for all
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